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Federal District Court Judge Harold Greene is best known for 
having presided over the Justice Department antitrust case against AT&T. 
At the same tiae he was hearing arguments in the AT&T case, however, Greene 
was Judging a cese given less aedia attention, but of no less i.portance to 
those involved. The U.S. Justice Department filed suit against the 
National Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that the NAB 
Television Code restricted the supply o~ television advertising. Judge 
Greene issued a consent decree in 1982, under which provisions the NAB 
eliminated Television Code sections regulating the number of commercials 
code subscribers could broadcast. 
AT&T and NAB Cases are Similar 
The AT&T and NAB cases share several interesting similarities 
besides haVing been adJudicated by Judge Greene. Both cases were brought 
against a pervasive'com.unications industry heavily regulated by the FCC. 
The cases both extended over a number of years and were settled by consent 
decree. In both, industry structure was changing dramatically during the 
period of the case in response to changes in technology and the overall 
legal and regulatory environment. Perhaps .ost important, in both cases 
the benefits of the consent degree to consumers were not entirely clear and 
are still a subJect of controversy. It is this last issue that foras the 
heart of the following discussion. 
History and Function of the NAB 
The National Association of Broadcasters was organized in 1923 
by radio stations responding to a variety of pressures, the most important 
being demands by the A.erican Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
for royalty pay.ents froa radio stations broadcasting copyrighted ausic. 
The NAB's role and Jurisdiction soon expanded. Television stations were 
included beginning in the early 1950s. The NAB began to provide technical 
assistance, aanagerial consulting, and industry lobbying, and to promote 
industry self-regulation. To encourage industry self-regulation, the NAB 
issued voluntary radio and television "codes" whose provisions included 
programming ethics and advertising standards. The first NAB radio code was 
ratified in 1929 and the first television code in 1952. 
The Television Code 
The Television Code of the NAB, administered by the Code 
Authority, contained both ethical and advertising restrictions. The 
ethical provisions included prohibitions on advertising $lcohol, guns, and 
some other products, and provided standards for a variety of activities 
including pay.ents by advertisers for displaying products within programs. 
The advertising rules set maximum limits for minutes of co••ercials, number 
of co.mercials, and number of commercial interruptions. Separate limits 
applied to prime-time programs, to children's programs, to some other types 
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of programs, and for network affiliates. The stated purpose of the code 
was lito maintain the highest possible programming and advertising 
standards. This is a reasonable goal for an industry hoping to maintainII 
the goodwill of a vast viewing and voting audience. The code also might 
reasonably serve to forestall more restrictive regulations imposed by the 
FCC and to counter lobbying efforts by consumer groups seeking stricter FCC 
regulation of advertising. Another possible (and unstated) purpose of the 
code is to restrict output of advertising in the same way cartels restrict 
output in an effort to increase Joint industry profit. It is this issue 
which motivated the Justice department to bring the case. 
Could a TeleVision Station Cartel Succeed? 
Provisions of the television code clearly aim to li.it output of 
television commercials. As mentioned, one possible reason to limit 
commercials is to increase Joint profit as would a carteL._ In the usual 
industry examples, the potential gains from colluding are clear. Colluding 
firms increase Joint profit by reducing output and raising price. The 
relationship between output and price for co.mercial television stations is 
less clear, however. Television stations do not earn revenue from selling 
commercials so much as they earn revenue from selling viewers to 
advertisers. Commercial sales only earn revenue as they are sold on 
programs which attract viewers and the price for commercial time is 
directly related to number (and type) of viewer. The implication of this 
difference between television and the usual industries is that a change in 
the number of commercials only indirectly affects the price of com.ercials 
since changing the number of commercials also affects the number of viewers 
of a program and thus the price of a co.mercial. Nor does reducing the 
number of commercials immediately reduce television station production cost 
as occurs in the usual industries. These effects aake alterations in 
number of· commercials re-latively less useful as a tool for changing the 
price of commercials and station profit. 
The Code Was Largely Unenforceable 
The foregoing argues that television stations have the potential 
for earning monopoly profit by colluding and reducing the .nuaber of 
commercial messages. However, a number of compelling reasons argue that 
television stations in fact could not or did not succeed, and argue that 
Greene's consent decree, even the original Justice Department suit, was ill 
advised. First, code subscription was voluntary and violation of code 
provisions was at worst (and rarely> punished by prohibiting a station from 
displaying its code-.embership medallion on station advertising or on the 
air. Co.monly, the Code Authority used only verbal persuasion to 
discourage misbehavior. That the code was widely ignored is beyond 
dispute. A 1963 FCC staff study calculated that forty percent of stations 
exceeded code standards. Actually, it is not at all surpris~ng that eleven 
hundred stations in the two hundred or so separate market areas were unable 
to coordinate their efforts and behave like a cartel, even with the 
assistance of the code. 
Stations Compete on Uncontrolled Dimensions 
As shown, code enforcement and coapliance were problematic. 
However, even if code standards had been followed universally, supranormal 
profit to stations was not assured. Television programming is a 
multidimensional product and code advertising limits do not prevent, and 
probably encourage, competition on uncontrolled dimensions. Each 
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individual station gains by attracting viewers and is tempted to do so in 
spite of the potential gains from collusion. Intensifying this temptation 
is the fact that uncontrolled dimensions are not enforced by the NAB and 
are in any case nearly impossible to measure meaningfully. In particular, 
stations have incentive to attract more viewers by increasing all of the 
dimensions of program quality, dimensions like signal strength, signal 
clarity, programming quality, and hours of operation. The effects of such 
a decision are obvious. The number of viewers increases, overall market 
price of commercials falls, costs increase, and potential monopoly profit 
is dissipated in whole or in part. The difficulty faced by all cartels in 
monitoring and controlling output is exacerbated in the television industry 
by the multidimensional nature of television program.ing. 
Industry Structure Was Changing Anyway 
The potential ability of the television code to increase station 
profit is reduced not Just by the COMplex nature of television programming. 
Dramatic changes in the broadcasting industry were <and are) taking place, 
changes ~hich further erode the ability of stations to coordinate their 
efforts in an anticompetitive way. In particular, every television program 
market has been facing increasing competition from alternatives to standard 
commercial broadcast television. For one, the FCC has changed its 
regulations to allow entry by 160 new low-power broadcast stations in the 
continental U.S. alone and has permitted 50 new stations to broadcast to 
viewers by subscription. FCC regulation is also permitting public 
television stations to come very close to competing with co.mercial 
stations for broadcast advertising. Television viewers are also responding 
to changes in prices and technology by purchasing an increasing number of 
videocasette recorders which compete with broadcast advertising when 
consumers watch movies at home. Perhaps most dramatically, however, is the 
growth of cable television. Although local stations are carried by cable 
systems, the benefit to a local station due to better signal reception is 
usually more than offset by the loss of viewers to the additional programs 
offered on cable. Nationwide cable penetration increased from 19% to 46% 
in the years the NAB case was being argued. Even if it was a useful tool 
in the years before the case was brought, the code's ability to monopolize 
broadcast markets nas been disappearing since. As in United States v 
Aluminum Company of America (148 F. 2d 416, 2d Cir. 1945>, industry 
structure had changed enough that no legal remedy was necessary. 
There is No EVidence of Code Success 
As mentioned, a television code can serve a number of valuable 
functions, one of which is to create aonopoly profit for aember stations. 
Although foregoing arguaents show that this function is a difficult one to 
achieve, had it succeeded, station profits would reflect the code's 
influence. Available empirical evidence shows no relationship between 
monopoly profit and the code. Statistical analysis by the authors of 
station sale price before and shortly after the consent decree shows that 
station profit is affected by factors like nuaber of station prograa 
viewers, network affiliation, possession of a VHF channel (better signal>, 
nuaber of competing stations, and cable penetration. Station profit is not 
enhanced by code cartel enforcement. The statistical methods employed 
include classical, probit, and liaited-dependent variable siaultaneous­
equations regression analysis. While the data certainly allow the 
possibility of collusion by stations in local markets, it is clear that the 
television code was not the tool used to enforce desired behavior. 
Consent Decree Ignored Viewers 
Evidence shows that the television code had little chance of 
enforcing a cartel and shows that stations received no monopoly profit from 
cod~ subscription. Even if it had been successful, however, a decision 
against the code might have been ill advised. True, a successful code 
increases the price paid by advertisers and so provides thea a cause of 
action. But, as has been argued in the AT&T case, Greene's consent degree 
very possibly Made the average consumer worse off. An effective code 
reduces the nuaber of co.mercials while encouraging stations to compete by 
imprOVing the various dimensions of program quality. Surely television 
viewers gain from these two effects. In fact, television viewer lobbying 
groups like Action for Children's Television recognized the potential 
disadvantages of the consent decree and filed briefs opposing eliaination 
of code co.mercial restrictions. Economic theory generally favors 
competitive markets but also recognizes that competitive markets may fail, 
especially in the case of products characterized by Joint consumption. 
Television signals have this characteristic, and encouraging their optimal 
production aay imply allowing some monopoly power. Judge Greene's decision 
seems to have .ade the not uncommon error of considering daMage to some 
industry participants and ignoring damage to consumers. 
Conclusion 
Co••only in antitrust cases against trade associations, the 
courts have made decisions based on a rule of reason, evaluating the harm 
caused by the association rather than proscribing- per se a given actiVity. 
Had Judge Greene evaluated the har.· caused by the NAB Television Code, only 
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one decision was possible: the code was not evil. Although restricting the 
number of commercials does (indirectly> increase price of commercials, the 
code was widely ignored. Nor could it be expected to succeed in the large 
"and diverse number of broadcast markets. In any case, the broadcast aarket 
was changing significantly during and since the case in a way that makes 
code enforcement even aore problematic. The introduction of low-power 
"drop-in" stations and subscription stations combined with the treaendous 
increase in cable television penetration co.bine to severely limit the 
ability of ordinary broadcast stations to protect their positions. 
Statistical eVidence confirMS these market characteristics. The code has 
no positive effect on station profit. Finally, an effective code likely 
benefits consu.ers by reducing the number of co••ercials and by encouraging 
stations to co.pete by raising progra. quality. 
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